AUGUST, 2021
Walter Hallstein met Konrad Adenauer for the first time as part of the German delegation at the Congress of Europe that was held in the Hague on 7-10 May 1948 by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. Adenauer was at the time the CDU leader in the British occupation zone. Hallstein was also part of that resurgent West German ruling class that was open to the European ideal. At the end of the war he resumed his academic career. He had already been ordinary professor at the University of Rostock at age 29 and in 1941 became the director of the Institute for Comparative Law and the Institute for Economic Law at the Goethe University in Frankfurt. During the war he was called up to the army and was deployed in occupied France. In 1944 he was captured by the Americans. After his release in 1946 he became at 44 the first post-war dean of the Goethe University. In June 1950 Adenauer was considering who would be in charge of the delegation for the upcoming talks for the implementation of the Schuman Plan. In the new Republic that was still under the Occupation Statute there was not a recognised diplomatic establishment and after he had to put aside other candidates for various reasons, especially the trusted Herbert Blankenhorn, that like all diplomats in the previous Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been a member of the National Socialist Party, on 15 June 1950 under the recommendation of Wilhelm Röpke, one of the fathers of the social market economy, he invited Hallstein for a meeting. Adenauer was positively impressed, and he immediately chose Hallstein to lead the delegation. Five days later Hallstein was at the inauguration of the negotiations. In that occasion he developed respect and appreciation for Jean Monnet and experienced an atmosphere of good will and trust that came from sharing the European ideal with all delegations. During the talks he proposed the model devised by Carl Friedrich Ophüls, that envisaged the institution of a High Authority, a directly elected Assembly and a Council of Ministers. He was instructed by Adenauer to manage the talks with moderation and he supported the compromise on the institutions that materialised the following August. Adenauer was satisfied with the way Hallstein conducted the mediation and decided to have him at the head of his foreign policy. With the separation of the Department of Foreign Affairs from the Chancellery, in March 1951 Hallstein became Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was ultimately in charge of a Ministry. That is because Adenauer kept the title of Foreign Minister for himself until the Paris Accords came into force in May 1955. Therefore, Hallstein had the role and the responsibilities of a Foreign Minister in all but name.1
Even though inside the German government there was general agreement about integration with the West, there were differences on how to achieve it. According to Hallstein there were several reasons to push for a unified Europe. Among these the military and ideological threat of the Soviet Union, the persistent political and economic instability of the non-communist western European democratic States and the danger of a conflict between the countries in the middle of an economic recovery in central and western Europe. Integration was not only a defence system against the communist threat, but also a way to manage the crises between the power centres of Western Europe.2 The new mechanisms of cooperation had to be substantially different from the disastrous nationalistic structures of the period between the world wars and at the same time they needed to be supported by the United States. The reputation lost by the European countries could only be gained back if the former big powers supported each other and worked closely together. The main condition was the settling of bilateral conflicts, above all the one between France and Germany. Only conciliatory policies could create the chance for balanced political relationships in the West. Hallstein believed that the best system that could provide a long-term solution to the problem was to pull together the coalition of Western European States into a federal organisation. Since the beginning of the negotiations for the Schuman Plan, the constitutional law and international law experts of the Foreign Ministry, led by Hallstein, lobbied for a constitutional guarantee of the unification process. They reckoned that the only viable approach for a solid international cooperation needed a number of contractually determined steps. Federalism was not only the appropriate administrative system for the Federal Republic, but also the best strategy to provide more stability and security to the Western European alliance. It was crucial that the proposals for economic integration that were on the table had a political purpose, that should eventually lead to an actual political integration. The free trade supporters, led by Erhard and the Federal Ministry of Economics, opposed this vision and favoured a consolidation of the international economic relations through intergovernmental cooperation.3 Hallstein insisted that the final objective had to be the achievement of a European federal State based on constitutional law, and he did not have great expectations for the concepts championed by Erhard of a simple economic integration with a limited political impulse.4 With the end of the Occupation Statute and the waning interest of the German population for an advancement of integration, nobody could determine if the reconstitution of a German army would prompt the return of nationalism and an adverse sentiment toward the unifying process. In March 1955 Hallstein warned Erhard of the dangers that a lack of progress and hesitant policies on the matter could produce. There were perhaps two years left to launch new initiatives and five at best to implement them. Otherwise disintegration would be the consequence.5
At the Department of the Federal Ministry of Economics that was in charge for the Schuman Plan it was understood, thanks to the daily work with European entities, that after the failure of the EDC the best options to advance integration were those that involved the economy, especially the idea of creating conditions similar to that of a domestic market. Hallstein concluded that Monnet’s proposals to broaden the ECSC to sectors such as transportation, energy as a whole and the civilian use of nuclear energy were absolutely compelling, but was also aware that behind Erhard’s objections there was an alternative concept that aimed to put all decisions on foreign trade completely under the Ministry of Economics and in the framework of the OEEC instead of the integration of the Six. He was determined to contrast that view with the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more inclined to satisfy foreign policy needs, making sure that the Department for Foreign Trade of his Ministry had more influence than the Ministry of Economics.6 Adenauer saw the confrontation in a pragmatical way. He supported Hallstein’s stance because he thought it was evident that with the integration of important economic sectors it would be possible achieving a political integration, and even though he would have preferred the opposite path, that was not feasible at that point. A few days before the Messina Conference, Adenauer left the double assignment of Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of the group that included Blankenhorn, Herwarth von Bittenfeld, von Eckardt e von Maltzan, and that led the Federal Republic’s foreign policy, and European policy in particular, only Hallstein remained at the Ministry.
Heinrich von Brentano took office as Foreign Minister on 7 June 1955, consequently it was Hallstein that on 1-3 June led the German delegation to Messina.7 The position of the German government was a summary of the different concepts within it, that resulted in a quite rigid negotiating posture that put Hallstein in the unpleasant situation of defending a view that he only partly supported.8 The statement issued afterwards remained vague and did not contain binding measures. It simply tasked the intergovernmental committee to assess the possible developments of the proposals. Despite the inadequacy of the compromise that had been reached, Hallstein informed Adenauer that the statement looked more modest than the real substance of the talks suggested. Mainly there was satisfaction for having convinced the French to carry on with the consultations.9 To the other European partners, the hesitant approach showed in the discussions was worrisome in regard to the future political stance of the Federal Republic, and they feared it would abandon its pro-European attitude in order to follow a more nationalistic agenda. This view was strengthened by the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the FRG and the USSR. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for the government to express an unequivocal pro-European standpoint. After von Brentano confirmed the pro-European stance at the Assembly of the Council of Europe, Hallstein underlined once more the continuity of the FRG’s European policy at the first meeting of the governments’ chief delegates on 9 July 1955 in Brussels.10 And certainly, it was with Hallstein’s approval that Carl Friedrich Ophüls, as head of the European policy matters, demanded to prioritise the superior political aspects of integration. For his part Erhard wrote to the Chancellor in April 1956 that he felt he was being personally discredited by the “European Romantics” of the foreign ministry. Moreover, he believed that Hallstein and the undersecretaries Carstens and Ophüls were too Francophile and were pursuing the ideal of a European federal State that was completely disconnected with economic realities in Europe.11 In addition to Erhard’s opposition there was also that of Franz Josef Strauß, that had just been nominated Minister for Atomic Affairs and feared that the German nuclear industry would face discrimination in the uranium supply, and that of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, led by Heinrich Lübke, that was concerned about sacrificing the interests of German farmers. At the same time Hallstein, Carstens and Ophüls tried with the assistance of the Secretary of State at the Federal Chancellery, Hans Globke, to persuade Adenauer to make use of his authority in the ongoing confrontation. Finally, on 19 January 1956 came the decision of the Chancellor, in accordance with article 65 of the Constitution, that gave him the power to decide the policy guidelines of the government. Adenauer resolved the dispute imposing the line of the foreign ministry, highlighting how the general political interest was superior to the interests of one specific economic area.12 The arguments were not completely over though. However, inside the Ministry of Economics there were officials in key positions, like Professor Alfred Müller-Armack and Hans von der Groeben, who were more sympathetic to the initiative started in Messina.13 Besides, Hans von der Groeben co-wrote the report of the expert committee under the leadership of Spaak between March and April 1956. Nevertheless, Hallstein was worried that given the participation of von der Groeben, the government had to adhere too strictly to the draft written by the committee. Furthermore, he asked the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Economics, Westrick, for reassurances regarding the necessity to keep an open attitude, so that there would not be the suspicion that the Germans wanted to derail the European project. He also was afraid that the opposing faction within the Ministry might alter the report and bypass von der Groeben. During the cabinet meeting on 9 May the two sides clashed anew, and only with the support of Adenauer it was decided to move on with the intergovernmental talks of the foreign ministers that were planned at the Venice Conference at the end of the month.14 Finally, the compromises that led to the signing of the Treaties of Rome were reached15, but on 16 March 1957 Hallstein had to reassure another time the French foreign minister, Couve de Murville, about the unity of intent of the German government in supporting the Treaties, after Erhard declared in front of a few American journalists that the common market was economic nonsense. According to Erhard his fears of a protectionist Europe were being confirmed.16
Hallstein contributed more to the content of the Treaties than the Foreign Minister von Brentano, that gave him abundant leeway during the negotiations in Brussels. On 21 March 1957 the Chancellor let the Secretary of State describe the main points of the agreement during a parliament session and on 25 March a conference of the foreign ministers, chaired by Hallstein, gave further clarifications on the 246 articles of the EEC Treaty.17 At this point the decision for the seats of the new European institutions and the designation of the EEC and Euratom Commission members had to be made. Monnet advanced the proposal to give the presidency of the EEC to a Belgian, with the intention to put at the head of the Euratom Commission the French candidate Louis Armand. But in Belgium the van Acker government was more interested in having Brussels as the seat of the new institutions, and so grew the hope for the German government to see the appointment of its own candidate.18 At first the intention was to appoint older secondary figures as an acknowledgement before retirement, but then as a possible candidate was also mentioned the former French Prime Minister Pleven. That prompted Adenauer to consider personalities of an equal stature, and Hallstein was one of the most qualified.19 The combination of all candidacies for all different appointments and the decisions on the seats of the institutions took several meetings. Eventually, in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers held in Paris on 6-7 January 1958, it was decided under proposal of the French and Belgian governments to appoint Walter Hallstein to the Presidency of the EEC. For the German foreign policy, this designation confirmed the recognition and trust that the new Federal Republic gained among the Western partners. For the first time after the collapse of 1945 a representative of post-war Germany was chosen for a prominent international role. Credit goes also to Hallstein’s constant commitment to the aspiration of unifying Europe as well as his belief in the reconciliation between France and Germany. On the American side he was seen as somebody that could implement the Treaties and help the Communities to become the premise of a political and economic union.20 Following the defeat of the EDC, Hallstein looked at the prospects of integration realistically and knew how difficult progress would be to achieve. Despite his pragmatism he was still convinced of the basic principles of federalism, as that appeared to him the only way to accomplish stability and prosperity in Europe. The Treaties of Rome were a milestone, but not yet the desired end goal. As President of the Commission of the EEC, Hallstein had the ambition to bring the Treaties to life and to constitutionalise federalism in Europe. He had no illusions about the resistance to overcome. Given the experience he made during the negotiations, he knew too well how the member States, despite the formal declarations in favour of integration, acted mainly in terms of their own sovereignty and their national interests. And the FRG was no exception.21
1. Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels, Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer? (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 16 ff.
2. Hanns Jürgen Küsters, “Walter Hallstein und die Verhandlungen über die römischen Verträge 1955-1957”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 84.
3. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 85.
4. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 86.
5. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 87.
6. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 87-88.
7. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 88.
8. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 89-90.
9. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 91-92.
10. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 92.
11. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 93.
12. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 94-95.
13. Gerhard Brunn, Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002), 105.
14. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 96.
16. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 102.
17. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 102.
18. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 103.
19. “Stellenangebote. Berufseuropäer gesucht”, Der Spiegel, 18 December 1957, http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41760100.html.
20. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 104.
21. Küsters, “Die römischen Verträge”, 105.