AUGUST, 2021
For the backers of European integration, the failure of the EDC put at risk all the efforts and the progress that was made up to that point. The sector-specific integration experimented with ECSC was an economic success, but the consensus was that without any further development in a relatively short amount of time, the spirit and the good will that came out of the shock following the world wars and the escalation of the cold war and that helped put forward the common interests of the democratic West instead of those of each individual State would be lost. As Walter Hallstein put it, the process of European integration was like a bicycle that needed to be in continuous movement to avoid falling down.1 The rejection of the EDC treaty by the French parliament showed how the nation States, and the French one in particular, were not ready yet to relinquish their full sovereignty.2 Therefore, it was not easy to understand in which direction it was appropriate to go to keep the European integration project alive and to make it acceptable for the political class and the public opinion of the countries involved.3 Among the many proposals two generated the most interest. The first one was once again an initiative of Jean Monnet and it seemed to be one that had the best chances of success in promoting another sector-specific collaboration among the Six. The field that at the time seemed to promise an energy revolution and was deemed as crucial in its civil and military applications was the atomic energy industry. It was still a sector in its early stages, but it was considered with great hope, looking at the prospect of energy autonomy in the resource-poor countries of Western Europe. The second one came from the Dutch foreign minister Willem Beyen, a committed free-market advocate that put forward an initiative that was already contemplated in 1953 during the debate about the European Political Community and that advanced a customs union among the Six, where all forms of commercial discrimination had to be abolished. With the establishment of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in April 1948 and the European Payments Union in September 1950, countries with a solid protectionist tradition could experience the advantages brought in to their economies by the liberalisation of their markets and encouraged them to cooperate further.4 Paul-Henri Spaak, who in 1954 became again the foreign minister of Belgium, supported these proposals and on 18 May 1955 the governments of the Benelux countries presented a memorandum to the other ECSC countries with the ideas of both Beyen and Monnet. The memorandum was put on the agenda of the meeting of the foreign ministers in Messina on 1-2 June 1955. The statement at the end affirmed that the moment had arrived for a new step in building Europe.5 A new intergovernmental committee chaired by Spaak was created and tasked with drafting recommendations that could be a starting point for future negotiations to implement the intents emerged in Messina. The British government was also invited to attend the meetings of the committee. Initially it was represented by Russel Bretherton, a brilliant theoretical economist but just an undersecretary at the department of commerce in the cabinet. He tried with little success to contradict the prevalent opinion in London, that deemed the process started in Messina as destined for failure. The Treasury and the Bank of England in particular believed that the common market was against the national interest. The economic establishment was of the opinion that such an initiative would weaken the economic relationship with the Commonwealth, limit world trade and make British industries vulnerable to the European competition. For these reasons in November 1955 Bretherton was recalled from the talks.6
In the group of the ECSC countries there were also deep differences. To stand out in particular was the confrontation between the opposing traditions of liberalism and dirigisme in managing economic policies. On one side there was the view of a customs union with a common external tariff, on the other there was the one for a free trade area. The Benelux and German governments were economic liberalists and supported a market economy, despite some differences in their positions. The Dutch were in favour of a supranational economic European union. The French and Italian governments were dirigiste, that is in favour of industrial and agricultural protectionism. But they also had differences. The Italians were ready to accept a customs union and embrace a European protectionism instead of a national one. The strongest supporters of protectionism were the French though. France was not only protectionist but was fundamentally hostile to any free trade, even though it would only be limited to Western Europe, and therefore opposed to the idea of a common market.7 The French government led by Edgar Faure was of the opinion that the talks on the common market should only be limited to a consultative analysis, at the same time urging the discussions on atomic energy to move quickly forward. On 31 January 1956 took power a new Government presided by Guy Mollet, who had a more favourable opinion of the common market.8 He also agreed with those who thought that a common market in free competition with the German industry could be a good chance to push forward a modernisation of the French counterpart.9 But Mollet needed to move cautiously in order to avoid a defeat similar to that suffered by the EDC in 1954, as the public sentiment and the National Assembly were still hostile to the idea of a common market.10 Still, the intention to use the new sector-specific integrations to the advantage of French interests was still there. The most important strategic goal for the French ruling classes at this point was to become part of the small elite of countries that had access to atomic weapons. France was the only country among the ECSC ones to have enough political capital to aspire to obtain its own nuclear deterrent. In Paris they were well aware that the country did not have enough resources to deal with the prohibitive costs of such a project, while developing a common nuclear programme with the Six would distribute the costs among all members and could keep under control the German nuclear industry, taking advantage of its great research and development capabilities. All members could benefit from the civil applications while only France could make the most of the military potential of nuclear energy. On the German side, apart from the opposition to the common market of the liberals of the FDP, it stood out the open criticism of the politician that was credited with the German economic miracle. The Minister for Economic Affairs Ludwig Erhard, who was part of the same CDU party as Adenauer, believed that the common market would be against the interests of the Federal Republic, as most of its foreign commerce was with countries outside of the ECSC area. For the economic liberalist Erhard, it was much more appealing the British proposal, introduced on 3 October 1956 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan, that promoted a European free trade area within the OEEC for industrial products. Erhard was afraid that a customs union would put Bonn’s economic policy under the influence of French inflationary and dirigiste practices. The anti-European stance inside the government about the possible problems facing German exports was disputed overturning Erhard’s argument, since the customs union would make it easier for German goods to penetrate the Italian and French markets, that up to that point were of limited importance for the German industry.11 It’s worth noting that for the first time the social democratic opposition was not against a European integration project. Party members accepted to be part of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe created by Monnet and they saw in the common market a way to expand the French welfare state model to the Federal Republic. Above all the SPD considered the initiative for a European Economic Community an essentially economic enterprise that would not hinder the possibility of a future reunification.
The work conducted by the Spaak led committee was presented to the foreign ministers on 29-30 May 1956 in the Venice Conference. At the end, a statement was released, in which the foreign ministers declared their intention to start negotiations for a treaty that would create a general common market and a treaty that would create a European organisation for nuclear energy. To that purpose they called for an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on 26 June 1956 under the presidency of Spaak. In-depth talks then started on 20 September. The outcome of the talks was by no means predictable. Unlike the debate on the European Defence Community and the European Political Community the hot topic of national sovereignty was not concerned. Nevertheless, significative economic and political interests were at stake. The firmness of the talks and the rigidity of the French government made many believe that the dialogue would not be successful. If that was not the case it is because of extraordinarily favourable historical conditions.12 In the autumn of 1956 two events happened almost at the same time that seemed to confirm the new shift in the balance of power after the second world war. On 4 November Soviet troops occupied Budapest and quashed the democratic movement that developed in Hungary. Between the end of October and the beginning of November a concerted attack of French and British forces was launched against Egypt, with the support of Israel, with the aim of reversing the nationalisation of the Suez Canal decided by Nasser, while the Soviet Union threatened to intervene and support Egypt. In the first case the United States accepted the Soviet intervention as it took place in what was then accepted as its zone of influence. In the second one, fearing a widening of the conflict, on the morning of 6 November they joined the USSR warning the two European powers to desist from the effort. Without the American support, the French and the British had to accept the ceasefire and retreat from the occupied territory. The latter event is often considered the symbolic end of European colonialism. It demonstrated that without the backing of the United States the European countries were not able anymore to pursue power politics as autonomous global forces. It was a traumatic event on both sides of the English Channel, but with different consequences. The United Kingdom drew back ever more into the «special relationship» with the American allies. France instead was convinced that it could play a global role only within a European dimension, especially with a strategic alliance with the FRG. And exactly on 6 November Adenauer was in Paris in an attempt to advance the negotiations on the EEC, that since October were in a deadlock, and to ratify the result of the referendum that on 27 October sanctioned the return of the Saar region under German sovereignty.13 In that occasion he gave a show of solidarity that was very much appreciated by the French counterpart. The Mollet government, formed by a coalition of predominantly pro-European parties, was in the midst of a worsening of the situation in Algeria that most likely would bring to a growing international isolation and a foreign policy with limited options. It decided therefore with a renewed political will to pursue a compromise on the most contentious issues of the debate. For Adenauer it was also first and foremost a political decision. As we have already seen, the priority for him was to be anchored undisputedly to the West and above all to consolidate the integration of the Western European States so that Europe could regain strength and autonomy, as he constantly worried that the American interests could diverge ever more from the European ones and that the United States could eventually find agreements with the Soviet Union to the detriment of Europe, that could end up with a full withdrawal of American troops from European soil. And to do so the French contribution was indispensable.14 It is in this context, at the peak of the Suez crisis, while Adenauer was in talks with Mollet in Paris, that Robert Marjolin and Karl Carstens were tasked with finding the necessary accommodations to achieve an agreement.15
With the change of climate caused by the Suez events and the resolution of the main differences, the agreement that was achieved granted many of Paris’ requests, but it was also acceptable for the German counterpart. At the same time, the common nuclear programme had been used by the other ECSC partners to incentivise the French government to collaborate on the customs union even though none of the other countries was particularly interested on the initiative. It was decided that France would have the right to develop its own nuclear military programme while the fissile material would be owned by the common authority, called Euratom. In the French plans this would allow them to be on an equal footing with the United States and the Soviet Union, whereas they could keep the developments of the nuclear industry in the FRG under control. Following an American intervention that lowered significantly the price of enriched uranium, it was decided not to build a facility for isotope separation as this would be unprofitable, which in turn limited the scope of Euratom.16 As for the common market the French pushed to include not only the industrial but also the agricultural production. The latter was not a subject of the talks held in Messina. But it soon became clear that to make a customs union attractive for the French, the trade-off was necessary. It would open up new markets and profit opportunities in a sector that in France had a vast economic, political and social significance and it would balance the expected disadvantage that the French would suffer compared to the more competitive German industry.17 The compromise felt particularly punishing for German agriculture, that historically dealt with an internal market where the demand exceeded the offer.18 Another concession was that French overseas territories would be included in the common market with a convention lasting five years, and above all it was created an investment fund of which France would be a net recipient, receiving a generous 311,5 million dollars.19 Another arrangement was found to satisfy the need for a harmonisation of social policies, which was one of the reasons that according to the French made their industry less competitive than the one of its neighbours, and that would allow France to adopt protectionist measures if after one year since the treaty became law there was not an alignment between French and German labour costs. On the other hand, the French request to require the unanimity of the Council of Ministers, hence a veto power for the national governments, to move forward to the second phase of the transitional period for the common market was not accepted.20 The French position prevailed also in securing a protectionist approach to the agricultural production, while the Germans, with the support of the Benelux countries, were able to impose an open market for industrial products. The internal market would be free, but it would be protected by an external common tariff. The Dutch and the Germans favoured the lowest possible tariff. The French exactly the opposite. The compromise solution was to determine as the external common tariff the exact average of the existing national tariffs. In this way the German and Benelux tariffs would increase, while the French and Italian tariffs would decrease.21 The FRG obtained that trade with Berlin and the GDR would be included in the common market.22
The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957. The two Communities differed from the ECSC for having less marked supranational connotations both in form and substance. In the ECSC the High Authority had supranational decision-making powers, while the equivalent institutions of the other two Communities not only adopted the more bureaucratic name of Commission but were also subject to the decisions made by the Council of Ministers, that in the case of the EEC would have meetings of the relevant national ministers depending on the order of business. The Council was tasked with giving legal authority to the measures proposed by the Commission. The role of the Commission was nevertheless very significant, and it was the most original part of the institutional structure. It was given the exclusive power of proposing legislation and implement it. Its members were chosen by the national States, but once in office they were granted full independence from them and their appointment was irreversible for the entirety of their term. The autonomy of the EEC was also limited by the fact that its budget depended completely on the contributions of the national governments, since it was not allowed to receive directly part of the fiscal revenues collected by the member States, as it was the case with the ECSC. It was a solution that let the member States keep the power to decide and legislate, at the same time recognising the need for an independent entity that would represent the stance of the Community and that would assure the implementation of the norms of the Treaty on a supranational level. The individual States relinquished their national sovereignty in limited instances, and only when they considered the transfer of power in line with their national interest. An Assembly was established for the three Communities with seat in Strasbourg. It was entrusted with consultative functions and its members were nominated by the national parliaments, although there was a commitment at some point in the future to have them elected with universal suffrage. The three Communities also shared the Court of Justice, based in Luxembourg. The Treaty assigned the EEC the responsibility of establishing the common market and to take steps for the convergence of economic policies of the member States. It was decided that in the fields of agriculture, transportation and foreign trade there would be common policies, with the explicit intent to reach a coordination of long-term planning, and a homogenisation of national legislation as much as needed for the functioning of the common market and the collaboration regarding social policies. On these issues the Treaty gave broad guidelines, that is the procedures to attain the stated goals, but it delegated its implementation to the future activity of the Communities. It was therefore a Treaty that gave the framework of a permanent contractual method, where seeking compromises had also to be permanent, with a continuous mediation of differing interests. The only binding and detailed prescriptions were about the set-up of the common market. Within twelve years, that could be increased to fifteen, the so-called transitional period, tariffs should be abolished for trade inside the Community through progressive reductions of their amount. The Treaty fixed deadlines and amounts. In the same time span and as gradually, the quantitative restrictions of trade at intra-Community level should be eliminated. For the agricultural produce it was determined that the planned common agricultural policy, to be implemented within four years, should be accompanied by a specific common organisation of the agricultural markets. In addition to the free movement of goods, in the common market there would freedom of movement for labour, services and capital and the freedom to practise professions and do business for the citizens of one EEC country in any other member State. It was introduced a set of rules on competition. These prohibited practices that could prevent free competition among economic actors, like public subsidies to businesses, preferential treatment for State owned companies or agreements to share markets, and fixing production quotas and prices. During the first two phases of the transitional period, the approval of the Council of Ministers had to be unanimous and, starting with the third phase, it would need a qualified majority of twelve votes out of seventeen. France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy had four votes each, Belgium and the Netherlands two, Luxembourg one. This meant that it was avoided the possibility of a Franco-German axis that could overrule the demands of the other members of the Community. The EURATOM Treaty was less complex and in hindsight much less important than the one that simultaneously created the EEC. EURATOM did not have enough resources to control the investments on the costly nuclear plants or create a monopoly on the purchases of uranium. Its actions were limited to the draft of norms, to the monitoring and mediation of government initiatives, during which time Europe imported more and more oil from the Middle East. After the ratification of the national parliaments the Treaties of Rome came into force on 1 January 1958.
1. Gerhard Brunn, Die Europäische Einigung von 1945 bis heute (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002), 101.
2. It is worth noting how even Adenauer’s deeply pro-European policies and the willingness on the part of the FRG to accept supranational projects were ambiguously intertwined with the pursuit of the restoration of its traditional sovereign character. See Raffaele D’Agata, “L’integrazione europea e la Germania”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 587.
3. Following the troubled developments of the EDC the number of people in favour of ceding considerable parts of national sovereignty to supranational institutions in the German public opinion significantly dropped. See Raffaele D'Agata, “L’unificazione europea e la Germania”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. II, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 427-428.
4. Robert Marjolin underlined the fact that without the liberalisation of the markets started by the OEEC it would have been unlikely that the common market would see the light of day. See Mark Gilbert, Storia politica dell'integrazione europea (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2005), 47-48.
5. “The Governments of the German Federal Republic, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands believe the moment has come to go a step further towards the construction of Europe. In their opinion this step should first of all be taken in the economic field. They consider that the further progress must be towards the setting up of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the gradual merging of national economies, the creation of a common market, and the gradual harmonization of their social policies. Such a policy appears to them to be indispensable if Europe’s position in the world is to be maintained, her influence restored, and the standard of living of her population progressively raised”. “Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC Member States (Messina, 1 to 3 June 1955)”, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), University of Luxembourg, last modified 6 July 2016, https://www.cvce.eu/obj/resolution_adopted_by_the_foreign_ministers_of_the_ecsc_member_states_messina_1_to_3_june_1955-en-d1086bae-0c13-4a00-8608-73c75ce54fad.html
6. Gilbert, Storia politica integrazione europea, 51-52. See also Marcello Dell'Omodarme, “I trattati di Roma: la CEE e l'Euratom”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 247.
7. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 249-250.
8. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 250.
9. Brunn, Europäische Einigung, 105. See also Leonardo Rapone, Storia dell'integrazione europea (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 25.
10. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 252.
11. D'Agata, “Unificazione europea”, 433.
12. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 2, Die Ära Adenauer, Gründerjahre der Republik 1949-1957 (Stuttgart/Wiesbaden: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt/F.A. Brockhaus Verlag, 1981), 348.
13. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 258.
14. The European political class was also convinced that to secure Germany permanently to the democratic West, the Atlantic alliance was not enough. The belief was that only a deep network of common interests within the European integration could protect Germany from a resurgence of nationalism and contain a future expansion of German economy and power. These concerns were expressed by Paul-Henri Spaak in a Memorandum for the British Prime Minister Eden on 7 February 1956. See Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, 340.
15. Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, 344.
16. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 264-265.
17. Brunn, Europäische Einigung, 108.
18. D'Agata, “Unificazione europea”, 430 ff.
19. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 261-262.
20. Brunn, Europäische Einigung, 113-114.
21. Dell'Omodarme, “Trattati di Roma”, 258-259.
22. Brunn, Europäische Einigung, 116.