AUGUST, 2021
The dynamics within the member States can help to understand the delicate balance of the often contrasting interests that had been developing in the Community and how these would shape the following events. Nevertheless, the crisis the followed the collapse of the negotiations at the Council of Ministers on 30 June 1965 is often presented as a personal confrontation between Charles de Gaulle and Walter Hallstein. At the heart of the conflict were two opposing visions of the standing and the goals that European integration should entail. On 4 December 1964 Hallstein gave a lecture at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, in London, and had a chance to outline his opinions on the role of the Community and the future of a united Europe. At the centre of his speech he described a number of faux problèmes that in his view defined the debate on integration. The question about a balance of power or a hegemonic country in Europe did not exist anymore. “In the European Community, the concepts on which this view of the world is based have lost their reality. The idea of integration has dissolved them. In place of the ever-changing pattern of coalitions and alliances depending upon the shifting interests of States, we now have an institutional order which is the expression of a unity designed to last. [...] The Community order is so designed as to maintain the equilibrium agreed to in the Treaty of Rome, and hegemony is thus excluded”. And after describing the decisional procedures of the Community he added that “in this system we can clearly recognise the features of a federal constitution. [...] One of the most urgent reasons for setting up the Commission was to meet the smaller countries’ fears of domination by some arbitrary majority”.
Claiming that there was a divide between national sovereignty and European unity was also another unreal myth. The purpose of the European Community was not to become a unitary State. But the dogma of national sovereignty and the idea that European States could be fully masters of their own destinies had become out of date. In a world divided in two blocs it was not possible to apply the old European balance-of-power system, when a change of alliances was simply a matter of expediency. There could be no spiritual unity between the free world and the totalitarian States. The rise of the new States of the third world and of China was driving the world towards polycentrism, but this would not be enough to allow European States to pursue a sovereign policy. In isolation they are too weak. “Nowadays only powers which can compare with the Eastern and Western giants in size and economic potential can share in the shaping of world politics and take their destinies into their own hands. A united Europe would be of comparable stature. The Nation-States of our continent are not. Their pseudo-sovereignty is not enough to secure Europe a right to be heard. [...] Only by joining in the unification of Europe will the States again be able to speak with a 'sovereign' voice in world politics”. Likewise, it was no less of an illusion than the others to object that they were giving up the “national” for the “supranational”. Europe needed to be built upon realities, which meant in the first place, upon its Nations with all their ancient and noble traditions. No one would be asked to disown their country, but that would not exclude the awakening of a new European patriotism. The new Europe “will not be governed by an international Areopagus, a coterie of men owing no national allegiance. The organs of the European Community are built upon the confidence of the member Nations. They are neither extra- nor anti-national, but at the most multinational. Let those who consider that the bond between the Community and the Nations is still too weak bind it faster; there are many ways in which the Community can be made more democratic and its Parliament strengthened. Let those who complain of the Community’s lack of authority give it authority in those matters where the individual States are too weak. Perhaps it is true that only States can act politically. Then let us create the European State – or is it Europe finally to abdicate?” The concept of Nation is not always synonymous with State. That was true in France and England in the eighteenth century, but not in Germany or Italy, where the State and the Nation developed quite separately. Another question that the critical observer may want to ask is if it were necessary to make a choice between the systems of federation and confederation.
Hallstein’s conclusion was that there was not a hard and fast distinction between federation and confederation that would require choosing between the two. One federal aspect is that member States have handed over some of their responsibilities to the Community. This applies to the whole of economic policy and to social policy. In this the Community’s constitution follows the German Federal tradition and not the American, as it is left to the member States to implement Community law. “Only such a federal conception can reconcile the unity and diversity of the States and Nations of Europe, for it alone ensures an adequate concentration of political powers while at the same time respecting – in contrast to the centralised unitary State – the proud and vigorous individuality of the member States”. [...] “There is, however, another more important feature of integration, by which it is akin to federation: it is a dynamic concept, that is to say its very implementation constantly creates new reasons for widening the field of integration”. [...] “Integration is thus a process and not a static thing, and this process is one that tends towards complete federation, that is, to the federal State. Of course, a European State does not exist until the final position has been attained – and this is in conformity with our concept of a confederation”. [...] “Perhaps the Swiss were not far wrong when they called their constitution La Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse”1. It was obvious that these faux problèmes alluded to the issues underlined by de Gaulle in his numerous attacks to the way that European integration was evolving. As President of the Commission Hallstein had become much more than first among equals, as foreseen in the Treaty. His personal standing and the success achieved in the first few years by the Commission, as well as the conviction in his own ideas, contributed to making Hallstein a standout figure in the life of the Community and gave the Commission great visibility, not only in Europe but on the world stage, due in part to the frequent meetings with heads of State and government outside of the Community.2 The Commission had become an independent institutional entity, it had a central role steering Community policy and gained a leading international profile.3 So much so that the American press frequently labelled Hallstein, albeit oversimplifying, Mr. Europe.4
In the meeting on 15 December 1964, after setting the common price for cereals, the Council of Ministers tasked the Commission with preparing draft proposals for the financing of the agricultural policy by 1 April 1965. It should suggest a timeframe for when the costs of the agricultural policy should stop being paid with national contributions and they would be funded instead by the Community with the direct management of external tariffs. The Dutch representative, joined by other members of the Council, pointed out that it would be unlikely for his national parliament to approve the management of the funding by the Community without granting oversight to the European Parliament and a strengthening of its powers. This was seen by many as a chance to turn the tables on the de Gaulle and take advantage of his ultimatum. If France wanted so firmly to complete the regulations on the European agricultural market, then it should accept a strengthening of Community institutions. Hallstein shared these considerations with his associates Karl-Heinz Narjes and Ernst Albrecht. He believed that bolstering European institutions was a logical consequence of granting own resources, and he was convinced that the regulations for the agricultural policy would not be accepted by the other member States without this reinforcement. To Hallstein and most of the Germans at the time, de Gaulle looked like a fanatic defender of national interests. But in doing so he overlooked the European dimension of his stand and had no understanding of his strategic reflections on the necessity of autonomy in dealing with security policies in Europe. In that regard he was even more inclined to expect from the French President a recognition of the logic of give and take, especially in the year of presidential elections, in which the votes of French farmers were decisive. Besides, Hallstein received in numerous occasion signs of agreement for his stance by the Italian and Benelux governments and their willingness to push for more integration after the disputes on the Fouchet Plan and the veto on the United Kingdom’s membership. As a consequence, he felt that the time was right for a reckoning with de Gaulle. Therefore, he decided to interpret broadly the task assigned to the Commission by the Council of Ministers. He was supported by Sicco Mansholt, who conceived the proposals with Hallstein and a small team of collaborators, without informing the other members of the Commission.
Once the French Commissioner Robert Marjolin knew about the initiative, he warned immediately that he found it completely counterproductive. Still, the majority of the Commission agreed with Hallstein that the chances of success were significant. The Commission proposals were introduced to the European Parliament on 24 March 1965.5 It was envisaged that the full funding of the agricultural policy by the Community would take effect from 1 July 1967, with a redistribution of the payments that would put France and Germany on the same level and would cap the Italian contribution. On the same date the common market for the industrial sector would be completed, and the Community would gain own resources coming not only from the tariffs of agricultural products but also from those obtained by the EEC for all industrial imports. In the measures an amendment to the Treaties of Rome was also introduced, that would increase the oversight of the European Parliament on the budget and modified the voting rules in the Council of Ministers that would make it more difficult for the member States to overturn resolutions agreed by the Parliament and the Commission.6 In this system the Commission would send a budget proposal to the Council, that would have the option to modify it before submitting it to the Parliament. The latter could amend it with a majority vote and send the budget back to the Commission, that would then be able to approve or reject the amendments. If approved, the Council could overturn the decision only if at least five countries out of six voted against it. If the Commission did not approve the amendments or part of them, it needed the approval of at least four countries out of six in the Council to have its version approved. If a majority were not reached, the legislation approved by the Parliament would be confirmed. This structure not only increased the powers of the Parliament but would make the role of the Commission much closer to that of a European executive branch. The Commission, with the support of only two countries, and regardless of their political clout, that is, even against the will of the four most populous States of the Community, could determine in large measure the budget of the EEC.7
These proposals tried to achieve a coherent unity. Finding a balance between the revenues coming from agricultural and industrial tariffs meant that the Community budget would not be financed only by the importers of agricultural products, while the increased oversight of the European Parliament over the resources transferred to Brussels would compensate the loss of power of national parliaments. It was an attempt to distributing equitably the costs and benefits of Community policies, assuring the French the completion of the CAP three years earlier than planned, at the same time reducing the burden of the contributions paid by Germany and Italy up to that point. And more power for the European Parliament should satisfy Dutch demands. The strengthening of the Commission, combined with the introduction of qualified majority votes at the Council of Ministers starting from January 1966, would make the EEC growingly supranational.8 As Bino Olivi observed, “the proposals of the Commission tried to create a balance of trade-offs between non homogenous measures and between a politics of interest and politics of values: the economic advantage that the approval of the financial regulations would bring France needed to find its equivalent in a series of political developments that did not conform to the French idea of European unity”.9 The extent of the Commission’s proposals could be explained on one side with a good degree of confidence in the quality of its plan and in the efficiency shown until then in implementing previous achievements, but on the other also to some preoccupation. The confidence that the member States would accept such an ambitious plan derived from the success of other equally ambitious initiatives that the Commission promoted, like the acceleration of the transitional period and the Mansholt Plan, and the positive precedent in finding last-minute agreements in the Council. The preoccupation could be seen in the timing of the plan, that betrayed the same concern that the Germans had, that is, that once de Gaulle reached the goal of a fully functioning CAP and won the elections planned for the autumn of 1965, there would be no chance of keeping in check the French posture within the EEC. And the insistence on own resources reflected the frustration of the Commission for the failure of any proposal that could provide adequate coverage of its costs. As late as July 1964 an initiative for the overhaul of procedures for the Community budget advanced by Hallstein was not taken into consideration.10
The impression that the Commission’s proposals left on the de Gaulle was disastrous. Even more so as he became aware of them thanks to the leaks that came through some of the MEPs in Strasbourg, and as a result Hallstein felt compelled to introduce them at the European Parliament first instead of at the Council of Ministers. De Gaulle had a sense of form and symbols at least as strong as that of Hallstein’s, therefore it is no surprise that he judged that formal misstep as the expression of a willingness to subvert the power of the national governments, that in their interpretation of the Treaties of Rome were at the lead of the system. Right after the official presentation of the measures the French government lamented that the Commission did not consult with the governments before it developed such a radical plan and that it deviated from the usual procedure without informing previously the Council of Ministers. It is in this context that he refused to discuss own resources and to give the Parliament more powers, as he underlined that it was necessary to focus uniquely on the financing of the agricultural policy until the end of the transitional period, that under current agreements was until 30 June 1965.11 It was not for the first time that Community negotiations looked tense and complex. And it had been possible before to find an agreement on sensitive economic issues that touched on the national authority of the Community partners. But never before the result of one particular set of negotiations was considered so important by such a large number of national delegations that it would limit considerably their ability to compromise. It did not help the absence of a mediating influence by the presidency of the Council, that in the first semester of 1965 was held by the French, and the rigidity of the Commission, that was strongly determined to see its plan being finalised. The main pattern in the last few weeks of the discussions was the contrast between the French, that tried to use their presidency to separate the financial regulations from the other elements that were part of the Commission’s proposals, and the Germans, the Italians and the Dutch, that tried to prevent that kind of outcome.12 At the meeting in Bonn on 11-12 June de Gaulle was not able to gain full support for his positions from Erhard, and so on 15 June in the meeting of the EEC Council Couve de Murville declared that France was not willing anymore to provide the Community with the revenues coming from agricultural tariffs at least until the end of the transitional period and therefore increasing the powers of the Parliament did not need to be on the agenda at that point.
On 22 June, in the last of a series of meetings between the German undersecretary Rolf Lahr and the Director of trade policies at Quai d’Orsay, Oliver Wormser, it seemed that it could be possible to reach an agreement on the financing of the CAP with direct contributions of the member States until the end of the transitional period, pushing back the key decisions on the management of tariffs and the powers of the Parliament. However, during the Council meeting on 28 June both the Italian and the Dutch Foreign Ministers, Fanfani and Luns, stated that they preferred considering the Commission’s proposals in their entirety, with Lahr and Schröder joining them, giving the impression of a reverse in the German position. With these developments Hallstein felt that he enjoyed enough backing to take on the French. When the Committee of Permanent Representatives produced a report that suggested that the most controversial issues should be dealt with at a later date, his counterproposal was to keep the transfer of resources from tariffs to the Community, but without centralising them, and refused to act as a mediator. He recommended instead that they could use another procedure that had already been tried in Community negotiations before, which was to «stop the clock» and continue with the talks until an agreement was achieved, and he expressed confidence that a compromise was possible.13 The Five did not agree with all the details of the Commission’s proposals, as it had already emerged in the COREPER discussions in May. But they were also aware that if they granted Paris an agreement on the financial regulations without obtaining anything in return, it could jeopardise any chance of securing future concessions. As a consequence, they tactically decided to insist on the indivisibility of the Commission’s plan, confident that a compromise with the French would be found, and that the parts unwanted by the national governments could be rejected. The goal was to achieve the completion of the CAP together with a parallel liberalisation of the industrial market, a more balanced funding system and a reform of the institutional framework less ambitious than the one advanced by the Commission. At the same time, the French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing presented in Brussels a package of financial measures specifically designed to gain Italian support, while Couve de Murville, despite the impartial role that the Presidency of the Council was supposed to have, warned of the serious consequences that would follow if the 30 June deadline were not to be respected.
None of these tactics proved effective. Being aware that such an alignment would not easily happen again, the Five remained united and dismissed both enticements and threats coming from the French.14 On the night of 30 June the last hectic consultations at the Council of Ministers took place with the participation of Hallstein. He declared himself ready to find a compromise, but refused to commit to specific obligations. Couve de Murville, who consulted with the Gaulle in the afternoon about the line to adopt, tried to put the blame for the breakdown on the Community partners for not honouring a commitment made already in 1962, with the intention to direct the dreaded anger of French farmers onto them. He then refused Hallstein’s recommendation that he would work on an improved draft and that the meeting be adjourned until the following day. At two in the morning he acknowledged the lack of agreement and the inability to reach a deal. During the press conference that followed he accused the other members of the Council of not keeping to their obligations and of carrying the whole responsibility for the collapse of the talks, plunging the Community into a deep crisis.15 It was not clear yet how the crisis would develop. That same night Fanfani declared with optimism and sarcasm that the date of 30 June was not the apocalypse of the year one thousand.16 The failure at the Council was the result of increasing tensions inside the Community, that developed not only in parallel with the successes achieved until then, but also as a direct consequence of them. As the concrete effects of integration became evident, the divisions that remained on the sidelines for some time about the role of the Commission and the institutional balance that the Community should have, came to the fore.17 After five days de Gaulle ordered with immediate effect that the French Permanent Representative in Brussels stop participating in the meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives that were tasked with making new decisions.18 Nobody could imagine that de Gaulle wanted to use the test of strength to attack the role of the Commission itself. The empty chair crisis had begun.
1. “Some of our 'faux problèmes'. Speech by Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community. Fourteenth Sir David Stevenson Memorial Lecture of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. London, 4 December 1964. Community Topics 17. Includes press release”, Archive of European Integration (AEI), University of Pittsburgh, last modified 26 April 2019, http://aei.pitt.edu/14258/.
2. Bino Olivi, L'Europa difficile. Storia politica dell'integrazione europea 1948-2000 (Bologna: il Mulino, 2000), 96.
3. N. Piers Ludlow, “A Supranational Icarus? Hallstein, the early Commission and the search for an independent role”, in Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, ed. Antonio Varsori, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 38 ff.
4. Hans Herbert Götz, “Die Krise 1965/1966”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 192.
5. Wilfried Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle. Die verhängnisvolle Konfrontation”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 178-180.
6. N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge (London: Routledge, 2006), 65-66.
7. Mark Gilbert, Storia politica dell'integrazione europea (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2005), 88.
8. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 66.
9. Olivi, Europa difficile, 99.
10. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 66-68.
11. Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle”, 181-182.
12. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 68-69.
13. Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle”, 182-183.
14. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 69.
15. Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle”, 183.
16. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 70.
17. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 70.
18. Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle”, 183.