AUGUST, 2021
The timing and the manner of de Gaulle’s veto, that was declared unilaterally during a press conference and without any prior consultation, caused anger and disconcert among European partners, that considered it damaging to the non-written rules of trust and cooperation that always underlined the work of the Communities.1 Up to that point it seemed that the typical bargaining of interstate treaties had been substituted by a balance based on shared interests and where trust among the parties allowed them to grant concessions, knowing that in other occasions they would become beneficiaries. De Gaulle’s veto damaged this trust and made member States less willing to delay the achievement of immediate gains. The stalemate could only be solved with an initiative that went beyond the Community method.2 At the Council of Ministers on 2 April 1963 the German Foreign Minister Schröder introduced a number of measures that should boost the activities of the Community. The idea at the centre of the proposals was synchronisation. Schröder argued that some aspects in the progress of the Community had been given priority compared to others. As a consequence, benefits had been distributed inequitably. A first seven-page document with a long list of steps to be taken in successive phases was met with scepticism from the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Representatives alike. In an attempt to preserve the principle of synchronisation it was then the rotating President of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Luxembourger Borschette, that tried to find a compromise focussing on three main actions. On the subject of external relations, the goal was to agree a common negotiating position in regard to the forthcoming Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the establishment of regular contacts between the COREPER and the British Head of Mission at the EEC. As for the CAP, the next chapter of the negotiation should be completed by the end of the year. Finally, it was foreseen a strengthening of the institutions, in particular with the fusion of the executives of the three Communities.3 This last point could be interpreted as an advancement of the Communities toward better organised and self-sufficient institutions. On the French part though, while conceding something to the requests of the other partners, it was not excluded to try and make use of a revision of the treaties to reduce the supranational elements of the Communities’ institutions.4 But it was especially on the issues related with the CAP and the GATT negotiations that it emerged how the decline of the Community method marked the dominance of French and German interests.
The concept of synchronisation was well in line with de Gaulle’s thinking. The Community would be acquiescing to the comparative definition of national interests and the progress of the organisation would not be the result of a supranational process but rather the overlapping of decisions that suited the contingent agenda of the most influential member States. By the end of 1963 the new approach led to the adoption of Mansholt’s proposals regarding the organisation of the market for dairy products, beef and rice, and a first provisional agreement on the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). At the same time the Commission was instructed to start talks for the Kennedy Round and procedures were defined for a periodical consultation with the United Kingdom within the Western European Union. In 1964 targets were also achieved. On 15 November it was defined the list of exceptions for industrial products that the Community had to propose in the GATT negotiations. On 15 December the Council set the common prices for cereals, effective from 1 July 1967. In this context the power of initiative of the Commission was strongly limited to projects that were included in the Franco-German agreement.5 With the progress of the Common Agricultural Policy and the international profile that Community trade had gained, the EEC became ever more central in the economic planning of every single State, and a key in the political management of important lobbies, like farmers and industrialists. A slow-down or even a break-up of the integration process would have very high costs. As the benefits were increasing there was also uncertainty as to what direction the Community would take. Member States were worried that the process could take them to unwanted results. It could be argued that the success of the Treaties was also due the fact that different schools of thoughts could support them, but in the middle of the 1960s the defining traits of the Community’s functioning were becoming clear. Therefore, it was much easier to see some discontent emerging about the institutional development or the sharing of costs and benefits among member States. The national representatives adopted very aggressive negotiating tactics, and defending their national interest became the absolute priority, in what was described as the death of the Community spirit. One of the clearest examples of this new trend was how the French threatened to quit the Community both in 1963 and 1964, if the goals set for the CAP were not reached.6 Once de Gaulle realised that with Ludwig Erhard and Gerhard Schröder leading Germany it would not be possible to create an independent and autonomous Europe in world affairs, he then became even more resolute in pursuing French interests in the EEC without compromises. If the existing European institutions could not deliver a political Europe as the General envisioned, these needed to be at least functional to the short-term needs of the French economy, otherwise there would be no point in having them at all.7 In the Commission there was growing concern for the spike in aggressive diplomatic tactics, so much so that in 1964 Hallstein wrote to several government officials of the member States warning that “the practice of attaching conditions to the implementation of tasks foreseen by the Treaty is contrary to this last and should be abandoned”.8
In the middle of the 1960s, under de Gaulle’s leadership, France had become the malcontent of Europe. Even though the French prided themselves for starting the integration process, many critics regretted that the General seemed to be intent in reversing or destroying those European structures that his predecessors of the IV Republic had helped to create. And yet France was indeed one of the countries that was gaining most from European integration. Thanks to the liberalisation of the markets the French economy prospered, and the growth of direct exports to other Community countries was only second to Italy. Besides, the way the CAP was being implemented contributed to the growth of its agricultural sector and an increase of its exports, especially to Germany. In this regard France was only second to the Netherlands in the common market. Moreover, France was the biggest net recipient of the EEC budget and therefore it could be expected that the French were more than happy for how integration was developing. But French unease was especially strong in regard to how the Community would evolve down the line, fearing that all the gains obtained up to that point could be at risk. The CAP was considered particularly vulnerable in front of ongoing German hostility. The worry was that Germany, in accord with the Anglo-Saxon powers, would try to call it into question in the looming GATT negotiations. Another danger was that, despite the agreement on the price of cereals in December 1964, the CAP would not be fully functioning without a final agreement on the financing fund. The relatively high price set for cereals would certainly lead to an overproduction by French farmers and without funding from the Community the whole cost would have to be paid by the French government. Thus, the French started 1965 with the full determination to achieve the finalisation of the whole structure of the European agricultural system. Previous successes left Paris with little doubt about the efficacy of their bargaining tactics. If in 1963 and 1964 the French prevailed over Bonn’s dissent with aggressive tactics, it was unlikely that in this case with such high stakes they would adopt a more appeasing stance. Another longstanding grievance for the General was how the Community was organised. De Gaulle would indeed take any opportunity to publicly attack its supranational features. At the same time this did not stop him using Community arrangements to gain the most in the bargaining and allying himself with the Commission in many of the negotiating marathons on the CAP. However, he started showing more frequently his frustration with the persistent federalist ambitions of the Commission, both in public and in private.9
Meanwhile in Germany the Adenauer era had come to an end and in the Autumn 1963 Ludwig Erhard became Chancellor. Under Erhard the policies of the Federal Republic remained strongly in favour of European integration. Germany more than any other country could benefit from the Community framework and pursue its interests without enduring the limitations caused by its subordinate condition as a defeated and divided country.10 Yet Erhard showed less interest for the traditional German federalist approach.11 An example of this could be seen in the proposal of the German government on 4 November 1964 to create new institutions that would operate alongside the EEC and further cooperation on European foreign policy, defence and culture, declaring on the occasion that the sole economic integration would not achieve full European unity. Such a stand did not imply the refusal of the economic path to integration, but did suggest that the future of the European experiment could not be put exclusively in the hands of the Commission. That the German proposals aimed at a strong decentralisation was not only an attempt to garner support from the French, but it was also a testimony to the changed attitudes of the Federal Republic’s officials.12 The mistrust that emerged toward French policies in the Communities after the veto in 1963 became under Erhard full-blown discontent and suspicion, and also on a personal level the affinity that Adenauer grew with de Gaulle never materialised with the new Chancellor. Erhard also felt that he needed urgently to accomplish foreign policy success in order to receive recognition for the renewed activism of his administration and to come out of the shadow of Adenauer and his towering reputation. Adenauer was now the CDU President and he would not spare his criticism of Erhard’s policies, lamenting the swift decline of the relationship with France. Such a success would be very important in the upcoming 1965 elections to meet in the best way the challenge of the SPD, which under Willy Brandt’s leadership had gained a significant credibility in its foreign policy, so much so that it was becoming a threat for the CDU, one that Adenauer himself never had to confront. In an attempt to boost his initiative and credibility he accepted after months of opposition to set the common price for cereals, giving in to the pressure of the Commission and the other Community partners. With the agreement on 15 December 1964 the German government believed to have made a key concession. It was a sacrifice that touched on crucial economic interests and the social balance of the rural regions of the Federal Republic, where the CDU-CSU had one of its most important constituencies. The price for cereals was set at 425 Deutschmarks per tonne, which was a lower price than the average German price, and that induced the government to provide subsidies to German farmers for their lost earnings.13
Hopes of success improved after the Italian government expressed support and promoted a meeting of the Foreign Ministers to be held in Venice to discuss the proposal. But in March 1965 Couve de Murville announced that he would not be participating at the Venice meeting and that despite the importance of consultations about the political union, there could be real progress only after an agreement on the CAP financing regulations. What Bonn was expecting in exchange for a concession it had already made was now presented as conditional to a more generous posture toward Paris. To the Germans it seemed like France was acting in a totally self-centred way and that it would not hesitate to impose unilaterally its own priorities on the Community if Germany did not stop it and push back to make it possible for the other partners to pursue their Community goals. And the best way to do it was indeed the forthcoming meeting on the CAP financing, the last piece before its ultimate completion. The feeling within German diplomatic circles was that if they missed this last chance the Community would become a market for French agricultural overproduction and a protectionist trade area, which would mark the failure of the whole integration process.14 As tensions were already affecting Community dynamics some additional elements of friction came about. Italy was less willing than usual to compromise, compared to its traditional moderating role and an approach that generally tended to favour the interest of the Community as a whole rather than short term gains. The reasons were both economic and political. An element of great displeasure for Rome was the difficulties that the Italian agriculture was dealing with. In Italy, the percentage of the workforce employed in the agriculture sector was higher than any other country in the Community, and yet the initial effects of the CAP had been extremely disappointing. The regulations for olive oil, rice, wine and horticulture had been either delayed indefinitely or programmed very inconveniently for the interests of Italian farmers, who did not enjoy the similar economic growth in comparison to their French counterparts. Moreover, as a consequence of the improved standards of living that the county was experiencing, meat consumption increased significantly, and most of it was imported from outside of the Community. The paradox was then that the most agrarian country in the Community had become the largest importer of food. Based on the CAP funding regulations these kind of imports were severely penalised. This meant that Italy, at the time still the poorest member State, in 1965 became the largest net contributor of the Community to the CAP budget. Instead of providing additional funding that could be used to modernise the Italian agriculture, the CAP had become an important item of expenditure for the Italian government. On the political level it is worth noting that in the spring of 1965 the Foreign Minister was Amintore Fanfani, who was part of a centre-left government and whose supporters did not mind a certain anti-Gaullist rhetoric. On the personal level Fanfani was also a departure from the negotiating style of Emilio Colombo and Attilio Cattani, who had been instrumental in many compromises reached at the European level. Italy was also aligned with Germany in the belief that France did not offer anything in return after the gains it made in December, and especially Fanfani did not appreciate the public dismissal by Couve de Murville during a visit in Rome of his proposal for a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Venice. One final piece in this picture of contrasting interests at the beginning of 1965 is the Dutch position. On agricultural issues the Dutch had more in common with the French, but they also cared firmly about the strengthening of the European Parliamentary Assembly. One of the main political priorities at the Hague was the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament. During the talks for the fusion of the Communities’ executives they already pushed in this direction, even threatening to block the whole agreement. If in that occasion the Dutch backtracked, it was difficult to expect that in a new debate on the subject they would be that conciliatory again. A new confrontation between the Dutch and the French on the powers that Strasbourg should be given was soon to be expected.15
1. N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge (London: Routledge, 2006), 12.
2. Bino Olivi, L'Europa difficile. Storia politica dell'integrazione europea 1948-2000 (Bologna: il Mulino, 2000), 87-88.
3. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 23-25.
4. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 30.
5. Olivi, Europa difficile, 90-93.
6. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 48-51.
7. Wilfried Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle. Die verhängnisvolle Konfrontation”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 177.
8. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 51.
9. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 53-57.
10. Olivi, Europa difficile, 91.
11. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 47.
12. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 47. See also Manfred Görtemaker, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Von der Gründung bis zur Gegenwart (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2003), 404-408 and Herbert Müller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977. Eine politische Chronik (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1980), 141 ff.
13. Mark Gilbert, Storia politica dell'integrazione europea (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2005), 85. See also Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle”, 178.
14. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 58-61.
15. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 61-65.