AUGUST, 2021
The task to bring to life the actual juridical implementation of the Treaties of Rome was certainly not easy. The Treaties specified the tasks and the powers of the Commission and how its members had to be selected, but the institutional architecture was not mentioned. Therefore, Hallstein and his colleagues needed to design the mechanisms of an efficient supranational organisation, tapping into their previous professional experiences. Hallstein had gained a considerable amount of experience taking part to the reconstruction of the German university system and, as a Secretary of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to the reconstruction of the diplomatic service of the newly born Federal Republic. By his side he could also count on the experience of Robert Marjolin, who helped build the structures of the OEEC, and Sicco Mansholt, who was involved with the establishment of the FAO. The model of the High Authority of the ECSC could only partially be used, as it was a specialised entity that could exert authority only on two specific industrial areas, compared to the Commission of the EEC, that was given much broader responsibilities. Accordingly, it was necessary finding new structures and new working methods.1 These are the portfolios that were assigned to each Commissioner: Robert Marjolin, Economics and Finance; Sicco Mansholt, Agriculture; Jean Rey, External Relations; Hans von der Groeben, Competition; Piero Malvestiti, Internal Market; Robert Lemaignen, Overseas Development; Giuseppe Petrilli, Social Affairs; Michel Rasquin, Transport.2 Walter Hallstein kept for himself the jurisdiction over the bureaucracy and the Directorates-General, hence he was responsible for the Executive Secretariat that would coordinate the work of the Commission.3 Hallstein’s ambition was to build an administration independent from the influence of the member States’ governments, and for that reason he was occasionally in dispute with them at the time of filling in important positions.4 To complicate things further, the new institution had to face some resistance, if not open hostility, from the national bureaucracies. In the meanwhile, the opposition of some States to choose Brussels as the permanent seat of the European institutions forced the Commission to operate in a semi-nomadic existence, holding its meetings in a variety of locations. The buildings that were provided at the Avenue de la Joyeuse Entrée in Brussels, despite the encouraging address, were too small and many of the Directorates-General had to be located in different parts of the city. It was obviously a non-ideal condition to produce administrative efficiency. Likewise, the resources that had been provided were so scarce that the Commission had to turn to the ECSC High Authority to be able to deal with the first payments.
The Commission did not have much time to overcome these difficulties. The Treaty demanded the first reduction of tariffs starting on 1 January 1959. At the same time, the French and the Dutch were pressuring the Commission to start preparing plans for the establishment of the common agricultural policy, that would be added to the original project of a market for industrial products. This required assembling rapidly a group of agricultural experts and the activation of contacts with agricultural organisations and associated groups inside all member States. And it was obvious that the rest of the world would not wait too long for the EEC to find an internal balance before it tackled the issue of its external relations.5 Adding to all this was the pressure coming from the United Kingdom, that aimed to reduce the supranational traits of the EEC with initiatives like the proposal of a free trade area, the attempt to put the new Community under the tutelage of the OEEC or later on setting up the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In front of this numerous difficulties it is impressive the success that Hallstein and his colleagues were able to achieve in creating a dynamic and effective institution. In its first few years of activity the Commission gained a reputation of administrative activism and efficiency. The first generation of Commissioners was able to work as a collegial unit and Hallstein and his colleagues had the common goal of gaining the respect of all States and avoid conflicts that would make their work even more complicated. They showed the national governments how important the Commission’s work was and in the first few years produced a sizeable amount of legislative proposals, which was an essential part of its success. Obviously, the Commission had to consider specific preferences and national interests when they drafted a legislative proposal. But especially in the early years it was granted the autonomy to make its own political choices and take independently crucial decisions that would shape the future development of specific European political areas. This was particularly evident with the conception of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Between 1958 and 1963 the majority of the key decisions on the CAP were taken by Sicco Mansholt and his collaborators. This does not mean that there was not the agreement of the Council or that its recommendations were not taken into account. On the contrary the approach was always to find consensus. But the main characteristics of the CAP were designed by the Commission, that had to fill in the gaps that were left in the Treaties.6
In regard to the customs union, the Treaties outlined a pre-determined sequence. There were widespread doubts though that the timetable could be respected, and in particular there were worries that France would slow down, if not obstruct, the process. The doubts were put to rest after De Gaulle on 14 November 1958 stopped negotiations for a free trade area with the United Kingdom. He then met Adenauer in Bad Kreuznach a few days later7 and devalued the French franc in December 1958.8 At this point it was possible for the Commission to intervene on the very cautious schedule that was set for the removal of commercial barriers.9 With two decrees in 1960 and 1962 the transitional period was reduced from a maximum of 15 years to 9 and a half, with the completion of the customs union by 30 June 1968. The effect of these measures was noteworthy, so much so that in 1962 the existing tariffs had been already cut in half. It is in this context that a document of the Commission was issued in the autumn of 1962 on the Action Programme of the Community for the Second Stage of the customs union. Its basic concepts were also recalled thereafter by Hallstein in his writings, and they underlined the political nature of the EEC and the implementation of the Treaties. The Commission was committed to make the greatest effort to establish the Community as a relevant entity in world trade.10 These developments encouraged businesses to carry out the necessary investments to be able to face the challenges of the common market and laid the groundwork to move from occasional foreign trade relationships to Europe-wide supply chains that significantly expanded the variety of goods available to the consumers11 and were the premise of a spectacular economic growth.12 The acceleration of the customs union was also evidence for the United Kingdom and the other EFTA countries that the EEC project was not a half-baked plan bound to failure.13 Furthermore, the creation of an economic bloc in the heart of Europe that could strongly affect the dynamics of world trade opened up a new chapter in the relationship between Europe and the United States. The Americans saw with favour the formation of the EEC and they regarded it as an organism that could strategically strengthen the Western bloc. Yet from the point of view of their national interest they were worried by the protectionist nature that the common market adopted externally. For the first time since 1945 the USA did not look at Europe as a junior partner that needed assistance in the road to recovery and development, but as a global player that had to do its part to advance worldwide trade. The American pressures led up to the discussions for a reduction of tariffs in the GATT framework, proposed in 1962 by the American President Kennedy, in which the Six were represented jointly by the Commission.14
Mark Gilbert observes that the Commission quickly became a more powerful institution than it had been anticipated. That was also because of the stature of some of the members of the Commission and the precise area of competence that it was given. The EEC Treaty assigned the Commission several and specific responsibilities and a predetermined timetable to execute them. The power of the proposal, in this context, became an important instrument, and an efficient decision-making system was put into place, with which the experts of the Commission could find and enact new initiatives and the Council of Minister could or could not give its approval. In addition to that, the Commission had to oversee importantly the very first supranational antitrust agreement. The norms in the EEC Treaty very clearly outlawed cartels in the member States, and the Commission had to devise how to eliminate them. The Commission was also given similar responsibilities in the area of illegal state aid, harmonisation of fiscal policies and oversight of common social policies.15 In the Treaty it was also foreseen the removal of all quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers among all member States. These were often the product of refined and sophisticated techniques of administrative protectionism and only rarely the consequence of explicit legislation.16 For the Commission it was not easy to start infringement proceedings in such an adverse environment that was so rooted in mercantilistic traditions. The European Court of Justice was therefore essential in its support. Both the Commission and the member States could file complaints if they believed that national regulations were in violation of Treaty norms. To the member States that were found guilty it was requested that they take the measures decided by the Court of Justice, although the Court did not have the power to issue any penalties in cases of non-conformity. The Court had also the power to adjudicate if the Treaty had been violated by a sentence under a national jurisdiction. In the first few cases it was raised the crucial issue whether the Court had the power to determine if national laws and regulations were in breach of the Treaty. And in the first few decisions taken by the Court of Justice that would establish precedent, it was sanctioned the primacy of Community over national legislation.17 Consequently it was recognised the constitutional validity of the EEC Treaty and the stand of the Commission was also confirmed, of a supranational Community based on constitutional law, in which the norms of the Treaty and the legislation of Community institutions united not only the member States but also directly every single citizen.18
1. N. Piers Ludlow, “A Supranational Icarus? Hallstein, the early Commission and the search for an independent role”, in Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, ed. Antonio Varsori, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), 39.
2. Members of the Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC), Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), University of Luxembourg, last modified 13 August 2011, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/members_of_the_commission_of_the_european_economic_community_eec-en-124beafd-2cda-47ff-9c56-e7a6bdc21526.html.
3. Karl-Heinz Narjes, “Walter Hallstein in der Frühphase der EWG”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 140.
4. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 141.
5. Ludlow, “Supranational Icarus”, 39-40.
6. Ludlow, “Supranational Icarus”, 40-43.
7. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 159.
8. Mark Gilbert, Storia politica dell'integrazione europea (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2005), 66.
9. The extent of the transitional period caused scepticism on the part of many observers. A piece in the Economist dated 30 March 1957 was ironically titled Red Letter Day for Shoppers. It was underlined that in 12 years if things went well, or 17 years otherwise, Italians that wanted to buy a Volkswagen could eventually do it paying German prices. See Gilbert, Storia politica integrazione europea, 56.
10. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 149. See also Hans von der Groeben, “Walter Hallstein als Präsident der Kommission”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 124.
11. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 148.
12. With the liberalisation of the markets, the economic interdependence among the Six increased significantly. While in 1958 the value in dollars of trade between the Six was about 30% of the total, in 1970 it reached almost 50%. At the same time the increase of trade within the Community did not stop an increase out of the bloc. Between 1958 and 1970 intra-Community trade grew at a yearly rate of 44%, while trade with countries outside of the EEC grew at a yearly rate of 15%, which was higher than the average growth of world trade. See Leonardo Rapone, Storia dell'integrazione europea (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 32.
13. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 148.
14. Rapone, Integrazione europea, 32-33.
15. Gilbert, Storia politica integrazione europea, 57-58.
16. Narjes, “Frühphase der EWG”, 150.
17 Gilbert, Storia politica integrazione europea, 59-60.
18. Von der Groeben, “Präsident der Kommission”, 132.