AUGUST, 2021
Between 1948 and 1950 a series of events intensified tensions and worsened the crisis between the western powers and the Soviet Union. In February 1948, the coup in Czechoslovakia took place. Between 24 June 1948 and 12 May 1949, the Soviet government blocked the access to West Berlin in reaction to the monetary reform implemented in the occupation zones under the western allies. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese civil war ended with communist success and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China. On 25 June 1950 North Korean troops started an offensive south of the 38th parallel, which started the Korean War. France, that until that moment had been the country most sceptic about the possible re-establishment of German economic and military strength, faced with these events and the mounting pressure from the United States, was finally convinced that it was necessary to take the initiative to find a solution that would satisfy American requests but that would not impede French needs. The growing European movement could be the way to achieve such goals in both the economic and military realm. From an economic standpoint the main worry for the French was to create a framework in which Germany would not regain full control of its enormous industrial capability. For France, the German question was not only a security or foreign policy issue, but also one about economic policy. The development and modernisation projects developed in France at the end of the second world war relied on free access to German coal mines, that would be essential to a full-scale functioning of French steel and iron industry, whose expansion needed to be protected by a German industrial recovery. In front of American and British opposition, French officials had to put aside their most radical plans that foresaw direct sovereignty over German Rhenish territories, historically at the heart of German industrial might and a source of French apprehension. They did not abandon their plans of a containment of the German recovery, but they reconsidered the means to achieve their aim. They otherwise risked being excluded from any influence on that part of Germany that the USA and the UK were determined to restore. Instead of subjugating Germany, the intention was now of controlling Germany and to anchor it firmly to Western Europe.1 The turning point came on 9 May 1950, when in the Salon de l’Horloge at the Quai d’Orsay the French foreign minister Robert Schuman made a declaration whose content was suggested by Jean Monnet, entrepreneur and financier that had been already involved in both world wars in consulting and organisational positions. In what became known as the Schuman Declaration it was outlined the creation of an international consortium of strategic steel and iron industries, whose governance was given to an international authority independent from the national governments. With this proposal France would be assured to have access to German coal but the two countries and their respective steel and iron industries would operate on an equal footing. In his statement Schuman brought together idealistic and pragmatical elements. The primary intent of controlling Germany and have access to its natural resources was coupled with a first attempt to establish supranational institutions that could guarantee peace and wealth for all peoples in Europe.2 Adenauer was fully aware that the Schuman initiative was an astute way to secure continuous coal supply from the Ruhr reserves, however he believed that these concessions were properly balanced with the advantages that the FRG gained from the deal. The treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951. France and the Federal Republic of Germany were joined by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy. The new treaty allowed the German government to join an international agreement with a winner of the world conflict on equal terms and it meant the end of the international controls over its production activities with the abolition of the Ruhr Statute. It also meant the end of one of the main reasons that stoked the economic rivalry and hostility between the two countries and made the subject of Franco-German reconciliation the starting point of all future European integration initiatives.3 The United Kingdom chose not to join as it was still very focused on a resolute nationalistic agenda. Adenauer for his part emphasised how in one specific area the treaty achieved for the first time European unity and how it was a model for further negotiations in the integration process. The German government also stressed how all signatories would welcome any form of association of the UK to the agreement.4 For the social democratic opposition, which held a positive attitude about German membership of the OEEC and of the European Payments Union, the issue of German unity was central in its assessment of the participation of the FRG in the Council of Europe and in the ECSC. In response to the government’s statement in the parliamentary session on 9 January 1952, during the debate on the ratification of the treaty on the ECSC on 10 and 11 January, the SPD parliamentary party leader Ollenhauer and the SPD representative Wehner took a very critical stand against the treaty. They considered it an unsuitable instrument to obtain the desirable aim of European cooperation. Besides, they warned that any integration of a free Europe could not happen without implying an eastward enlargement. They also believed that the problem of German unity did not play any role during the negotiations for the Schuman plan. Therefore, the SPD could not subscribe to the inevitability of the Schuman plan, considering that it would complicate the possibility of a reunification of the German territory.5 On 11 January 1952 the parliament ratified the treaty with 232 votes in favour, 143 votes against and 3 abstentions.6
1. Leonardo Rapone, Storia dell'integrazione europea (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 13-14.
2. “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany [...] With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible”. “The Schuman Declaration”, European Union, last modified 7 May 2020, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.
3. Herbert Müller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977. Eine politische Chronik (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1980), 15.
4. Müller-Roschach, Deutsche Europapolitik, 25.
5. Müller-Roschach, Deutsche Europapolitik, 27-28.
6. Müller-Roschach, Deutsche Europapolitik, 29. See also Donatella Viti, “L'integrazione europea e la Francia”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 384.