AUGUST, 2021
The first indications that the French were considering a boycott of Community institutions as a way to exert pressure go back to May 1965, when Couve de Murville received de Gaulle’s approval for such a strategy and faced the negotiations knowing that his country would react strongly if an agreement could not be found. Some observers even considered the failure of the negotiations just an excuse to launch an attack on the EEC institutions. Nevertheless, the inability to complete the regulations for the CAP was in and of itself a source of intense discontent, and it could be regarded as a sufficient reason to adopt the tactics that Couve de Murville suggested to the General. However, it should be noted that the boycott was less radical than it first appeared at first glance. Even though the French Permanent Representative in Brussels was recalled, his deputy stayed, and many members of the French delegation kept taking part to the meetings of the different working groups. When necessary, Paris still interacted with Community institutions and allowed some decisions to be taken by means of the EEC’s written procedure. France had too many interests tied up in the Community system to allow its institutions to grind to a complete halt. But once the confrontation had started it offered the French government an opportunity to attack those institutional elements of the Community that in many circumstances de Gaulle had publicly criticised. As long as the practical advantages of the Community and the implementation of the CAP continued, Gaullist France could turn a blind eye towards what it considered the aberrations of the system. In the negotiating marathons on the agricultural policy that went on until the spring of 1965, the dissatisfaction about the function and the aspirations of the Commission was mitigated by the recognition that it used its institutional clout to push strongly towards outcomes that overlapped extensively with French interests. Attacking the role of the Commission and starting a confrontation on institutional matters could have threatened the considerable economic benefits that France was expecting to receive, but in front of the form and the substance of the March proposals this common ground disappeared. In the summer months the signs that France would start an offensive against the institutional framework of the EEC had been increasing and in July Lahr anticipated that de Gaulle in September would put on the agenda amending the Community institutions.1
On 9 September 1965 de Gaulle’s long-awaited press conference took place. The French President did not spare the predictable bashing of all actors involved in the crisis but criticised especially the structures and the dynamics derived from the Treaties of Rome.2 As they were dealing with a seemingly attempt to call into question the whole European integration as it was, the disappointment on the part of the Five for the French behaviour was not followed by the softening that possibly de Gaulle and his ministers assumed. On the contrary, the Five showed resolve in coordinating their positions, in spite of some not unremarkable differences in economic interests and institutional preferences. The intention was to find a course of action that could solve the dispute with France and at the same time develop a mode of operation that would allow the Community to continue functioning. By doing so, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands in particular seemed to show the same determination to thwart de Gaulle’s plans on the future of the Community that caused the crisis in the first place. However, the activities of the Community were brought to a minimum and definitive decisions on significant matters that could generate further friction with the French were avoided. A first measure to try and bring France back to the negotiating table was to let the Commission draft new proposals on the funding of the CAP, in which were eliminated some of the most controversial points and that included a complex funding mechanism that would be extremely advantageous for Paris. It was not a coincidence that contrary to the proposals introduced in March, Marjolin’s contribution in this case had been crucial. But it was also evident that the Five took directly charge of the crisis’s management, while the Commission was considerably marginalised during the months of the French boycott. Informal meetings between the Foreign Ministers without the Commission became frequent, with the latter that was excluded from an active part in trying to solve a crisis in which it was involved from the very beginning.
The progress towards reconciliation proceeded cautiously and very slowly. The need for a cautious approach was amplified by the elections planned in the Autumn of 1965 both in Germany and France. This did not allow the political class of both countries to look too accommodating in dealing with the demands of the neighbour on the other side of the Rhine. With time though some very tangible issues that required a resolution of the crisis started to become more urgent. If France feared that a system of which it had been the main beneficiary could be damaged, Germany worried about the disruption of the GATT negotiations, that would undermine one of the main goals of its economic policy. On the institutional front it emerged rapidly a consensus against any changes to the Treaties of Rome or any formal reduction of the Commission’s powers but at the same time a willingness to compromise on the voting with qualified majority and on the procedures with which the Commission operated. After some hesitations and intense exchanges at bilateral and collective level, on 25-26 October the Five organised a meeting of the Foreign Ministers, chaired by Emilio Colombo as rotating President. They issued a document that invited the French to take part in a Council meeting for talks about the crisis, to be held exceptionally without the Commission, but within Treaty rules. The document was followed by a letter written by Colombo to Couve de Murville that renewed the will of the Five to discuss the institutional objections advanced by the French, while reasserting their unchanged resolve to rule out any amendment to the Treaty. In the meantime, the first round of the French presidential elections seemed to suggest that there was some risk in adopting too much of an aggressive posture against the European Community. Even though it was difficult to assess how much the tensions with the European allies informed the outcome of the election, it was evident that the opposition to de Gaulle conducted a pro-European campaign and that among French farmers it was gaining ground a critical point of view on a strategy that seemed to hamper a system so favourable to their interests. Despite his re-election to the French presidency, just the fact that he was forced by François Mitterrand into a run-off vote in December made it necessary for de Gaulle to show a stance that would make him less vulnerable to the attacks of the critics of his European policies.3 It was telling that a few days after his win on 19 December, de Gaulle manifested his interest for the invitation of the Five. It was actually not conceivable to take the crisis to a breaking point and the French President could push his offensive only to the extent that his counterpart was willing to accept.4 Whereas the French were against a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in a Community setting and therefore were against the obvious choice of convening in Brussels, a compromise was found picking Luxembourg for the gathering. Not the usual location for the Council of Ministers of the EEC, but still one of its institutional sites. Gradually it became clear what the outlines of a deal between France and the Five could be. The main element would be an interpretative document that would address the French discontent against the institutional framework but without amending the Treaty itself.5
On 17 January 1966 the Ministers of the Six finally met in Luxembourg. Compared to the most pessimistic expectations regarding the French attitude, it became quickly clear that Couve attended the meeting with a genuine commitment to reach an agreement. It was easy to see the difference between the desire to achieve radical change expressed by de Gaulle in his press conference in September and by Couve himself in front of the National Assembly and the actual requests that were now put forward by the French. Apart from requesting the exemption from the qualified majority voting system for matters of extraordinary national sensitivity, Couve presented a list in ten points, soon dubbed the French decalogue in Community circles, that urged to make some changes in the way the Commission operated. It was significant that in the French requests there was not any real questioning of the notion of supranationality, any demand for Treaty change, or any suggestion that the Commission be reduced to a mere civil service. Even the drafting of the ten individual points was much less far-reaching than many had expected: Rutten, the Dutch deputy permanent representative, reportedly commented upon reading the decalogue that “if this was what all the fuss was about there need be no crisis”.6 Thus, on the issue of the Commission the French negotiators showed to be ready to compromise and accepted that its tasks should continue being regulated by article 162 of the Treaty, which safeguarded the dialectic nature of the relationship between the Commission and the Council.7 The Permanent Representatives were tasked with drafting a document that summed up the outcome of the meeting. In it were many points of the French decalogue, but it avoided some of the most critical elements against the Commission and toned down its language. It asked the Commission to strictly adhere to formal procedures, as it had always been the case until the events that brought to the crisis.
Finding an agreement on the voting system with qualified majority proved much more complicated. Despite a general agreement that it was a procedure to be used cautiously, the Five would not accept drafting any document that excluded entirely the adoption of qualified majority voting, even about topics of particular significance for the member States. None of the language that was suggested could bridge the gap between the parties. Consequently, the session was adjourned, and it was agreed to continue the Extraordinary Council ten days later. The delegations then met again on 27 January in Luxembourg. The breakthrough came as Couve de Murville suggested that France would be ready to address its position on qualified majority not necessarily through a common statement, but instead using an already used Community device, namely a unilateral declaration. In this way the last obstacle to overcome the crisis was removed and the foundation was laid to reach what it would later come to be known as the «Luxembourg compromise».8 It was decided that when the essential interests of a member State were involved, the Council of Ministers should make all efforts necessary to reach a unitary position. If this were not possible the text of the agreement offered the two possible different interpretations that came out of the discussion. The point of view of the French government was that it was absolutely necessary reaching unanimity, while the Five rejected this standpoint and did not exclude the possibility of a ruling in the event of a dissenting minority in the Council. But the contrast was rather speculative than practical. As a matter of fact, the Five fully endorsed the idea of unanimity, and it was with this interpretation that the Luxembourg compromise became part of the material constitution of the EEC. The adoption of the qualified majority voting system was postponed indefinitely and the veto power of member States was preserved.9 However, since the crisis erupted, the attitude of all parties showed a shared crucial determination to safeguard the Community system. Even though the immediate economic interests were often perceived as more urgent, it is important not to forget the political meaning that the EEC had achieved by then, and that was something that nobody was willing to undermine. On the contrary, a significant number of Europe’s elected leaders, and the seeming majority of their political elites, believed that the EEC was already a deeply important political venture which both symbolised how far the continent had distanced itself from past conflict and had vested in it multiple hopes about much more extensive political cooperation and unity in the future. With the talks that followed the compromise in January, and that took place in May, June and July 1966, the concrete steps necessary to implement the economic goals of each member State were finalised. That paved the way for the completion of the CAP and the common market, and an agreement in the GATT negotiations. Thus, the Community could solve the most important and serious crisis of its eight years of history.10
Analysis, assessment and consequences of the Luxembourg compromise generated a heated debate since January 1966 and thereafter. Many saw it as a fracture in the evolution and progress of the Community, of which de Gaulle was the main culprit. The French President was able to frustrate Hallstein’s federal ambitions, but in so doing he condemned the Community to a long period of stagnation and immobilism. In fact, the debate that emerged following the crisis born out of the Commission’s proposals exposed to a larger audience the somewhat cryptical mechanisms of the Brussels institutions and forced the member States to take a definitive stance regarding some issues on which until then they had much more leeway. In other words, until 1966 the governments of the Five explained and justified their European policies to their electorate and in their respective parliaments in much more radical federalist terms than what the French government did in explaining those same measures at the National Assembly. The radicalism of Hallstein’s proposals and the French reaction to them pushed the Five to take a clearer position on what kind of European system they wanted and to reject more explicitly than ever before what they did not want to see implemented. They were confronted with a clear choice between de Gaulle’s intergovernmental model and the federalism advanced by the Commission President. At that point it became obvious that the Five rejected both these opposing visions and embraced the hybrid institutional system that gradually emerged since the very beginning of the Community project. Even though in 1966 there was not much enthusiasm for a radical federalist reform of the system, nevertheless it was deemed necessary to preserve the Treaty and its mechanisms to keep open all development possibilities for the future.11
1. N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge (London: Routledge, 2006), 71-74.
2. “Press conference held by Charles de Gaulle (9 September 1965)”, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), University of Luxembourg, last modified 23 October 2012, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/press_conference_held_by_charles_de_gaulle_9_september_1965-en-169b1692-c7dd-4ad4-b5fb-67e0e28edd02.html.
3. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 79-93.
4. Wilfried Loth, “Hallstein und de Gaulle. Die verhängnisvolle Konfrontation”, in Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Wilfried Loth, William Wallace, ed. Wolfgang Wessels (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995), 185.
5. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 90-93.
6. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 97-98.
7. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 97-98.
8. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 98-101.
9. Leonardo Rapone, Storia dell'integrazione europea (Roma: Carocci, 2002), 50-51.
10. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 114-117.
11. Ludlow, Crises of the 1960s, 118-124.