AUGUST, 2021
With the unconditional surrender signed by Grand Admiral Dönitz on 8 May 1945, the allied forces that came out as winners of the second world war needed to move from combat operations to the organization and administration of the defeated enemy. It became soon clear how the alliance between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, enabled by the unexpected attack that Hitler pushed forward against the Soviet Union in 1941, turned into an uneasy relationship filled with mistrust and recriminations that led to open hostility and that anticipated an open conflict. In addition, with Roosevelt’s death, such an alliance dictated by external factors lost the main driving force in the ambition to integrate the Soviet Union in a system of world governance. This was already evident in the summer of 1945 in Potsdam, in the conference that was aimed at finding a common organization of the German territory by the winning powers. The divisions comprised the economic model to be adopted in Germany, the Soviet support of the annexation by Poland of the territories East of the line Oder-Neisse, and the key issue of reparations. The failure to agree on a joint reparation policy was a major step towards ultimate partition.1 What was supposed to be a temporary partition of German territory grew slowly into a consolidated reality that saw two distinct entities claiming statehood in this new European scenario. The differences regarding the German issue were also significant among western powers. The main focus of the Anglo-Saxon powers was rapidly shifting from the danger of a German resurgence to the most immediate one of a menacing eastern bloc hegemonized by the Soviet Union. As the confrontation with the Soviet Union intensified, for the United States and the United Kingdom the priority became a European alliance system that could contain the Soviet expansionism toward the west and in which Germany, as the main theatre of this confrontation, should play a key role through a new economically strong and rearmed West German State. For the ruling class in Paris the possibility of a German resurgence was still more worrying than the Soviet threat. For the French government the prime concern was to find a solution for the German question that would protect France from possible future attacks once and for all.2 In this context, what was once a purely abstract debate about the need of some kind of unity among European States became ever more present. The beginning of the formal debate about European integration is usually identified with the speech that Winston Churchill gave at the University of Zurich on 19 September 19463, in which he declared that “we must build a kind of United States of Europe” and that “the first step in the recreation of the European Family must be a partnership between France and Germany”.4 At this point the United Kingdom still had the belief to be one of the three world powers with the United States and the Soviet Union and saw France’s role as that of a regional power that should lead a group of States in the continent in opposition to the eastern bloc. How this was supposed to happen was still unclear. France for its part was not particularly interested in a federal or supranational entity. And despite the defeat suffered in the war at the hands of the German Reich and the marginal role that it played along the winning nations, it still hoped to take advantage economically and militarily of some kind of intergovernmental partnership while keeping total autonomy. All the more so as the control of the overseas territories reinforced the view of the French that they were still one of the world powers.5 Nevertheless the consolidation of the new bipolar order that was coming into being at the end of the conflict could hardly be questioned and Europe was a devastated continent that was completely reliant on the American help and support, and whose influence became decisive. The United States could not accept that the European order would be based again on the old balance of power of the national States, that throughout history brought permanent instability and finally the destruction of its own political and economic might. That is why in their effort to reconstruct Europe within the framework of the European Recovery Program, the United States demanded to deal with a common organisation and not with the single European countries to manage the aid. For this purpose, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was established on 16 April 1948.6 As the American State Secretary George Marshall put it, it was expected from the Europeans an unprecedented experiment in the field of international organisations.7 On this basis other projects with differing fortunes were created, that promoted a collaboration or association of the western European States, in economic, social and military areas. On 5 May 1949, the Treaty of London instituted the Council of Europe. The original signatories were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The intergovernmental organisation aimed at defending the values of democracy and promote economic and social progress in Europe, and more generally achieving greater unity among members.8 On 13 July 1950 the Federal Republic of Germany also joined. In the meanwhile, a number of military organisations were also being created. The Treaty of Dunkirk on 4 March 1947, that served to provide mutual assistance between France and the United Kingdom. The Treaty of Brussels on 17 March 1948, that expanded the alliance to the Benelux countries. On 4 April 1949 was signed in Washington D.C. the treaty that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the formal extension of the military alliance and of the principle of mutual assistance in case of attack to Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the United States.9
The Basic Law for the Republic of Germany came into force on 23 May 1949, and elections for the new Bundestag were held on 14 August. The CDU/CSU alliance won 139 seats, followed by the social democrats of the SPD with 131 seats, the liberals of the FDP with 52 and the communists of the KPD with 15 seats.10 The CDU, in a coalition with the Bavarian catholic CSU, was one of the main novelties of the German political landscape in comparison to the parties of the Weimar republic. It was a Christian inspired political formation that was much more diverse than the old and mainly catholic German Centre Party. It joined together catholic industrial workers from the Ruhr region and catholic farmers from Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria with the protestant farmers and middle class from the northern regions. A middle class and Christian inspired party was then formed, that accepted many of the ideas of Christian socialism. Such a combination of different forces was seen by many as destined to failure, but owing to the political skills of Konrad Adenauer, who already served as mayor of Cologne and as president of the parliamentary council that drafted the constitution of the FRG, the CDU stabilised and grew in strength and Adenauer quickly emerged as the main figure in the new party. His position was further reinforced with the escalation of the cold war and the flight of Jakob Kaiser, the CDU leader in the Soviet zone, who sought refuge in the West.11 As the party that won the relative majority of seats, the CDU/CSU still needed to find a coalition partner to form a government. Many on the left of the party, including Karl Arnold12 and the Presidents of many Länder where CDU and SPD were already governing together13, pushed to form a Grand Coalition with the Social Democrats as the best solution to deal with the numerous and complex problems facing of the country. Adenauer on the other hand wanted to avoid the kind of varied and quarrelsome alliances that were often formed in the Weimer Republic and favoured instead a solution that guaranteed a more homogenous government with the liberals and that would make possible implementing his programme for a social market economy. Once he managed to gather enough support to his course inside the CDU, on 15 September 1949 Adenauer was elected by the Bundestag as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany by a margin of one vote, leading a coalition that included the FDP and the conservatives of the Deutsche Partei.14 The following week he was received by the High Commission in a brief ceremony held on 21 September, when he introduced his Cabinet to the High Commissioners and the entry into force of the Occupation Statute was announced.15 This limited the extent of the Chancellor’s powers and gave the allied Commission important competencies, firstly on foreign policy, but also on commerce, economic policies, reparations and disarmament. It also gave the allied forces the faculty of assuming full powers in case of an emergency in which the security of the country were at risk.16 It was only until 15 March 1951 that Adenauer was finally able to officially become the head of the foreign ministry, a position that he would hold in conjunction with that of Chancellor.17 The first relevant act by the new government on an international level was the signing of the Petersberg Agreement on 22 November 1949, which allowed the FRG to join the Council of Europe and the OEEC, to open consulates in other countries and take a seat on the board of the International Ruhr Authority.18 For this decision Adenauer was strongly criticised by the leader of the opposition social democrats Kurt Schumacher, who was suspended temporarily from the Bundestag for calling Adenauer the Chancellor of the Allies during an all-night debate on 24-25 November.19 According to the most critical voices, with the signing of the agreement Adenauer accepted, in exchange for the secured concessions, that the main German industrial sector remained as a matter of fact under tutelage of the Allies, therefore legitimising the fragmentation of the national territory and sacrificing its unity. The criticism intensified with the signing of the Conventions between France and the Saar on 3 March 1950, that saw France increasing its economic and political influence in the region and let the Germans worry about a permanent loss of sovereignty over the territory.20 Nevertheless, Adenauer was firmly convinced that these sacrifices were necessary to allow Germany to re-enter the international sphere.21
In the past thirty years Adenauer experienced the European national States drive one another toward total destruction, with a waste of resources that was one of the reasons of the historic decline of European political might all over the world. Above all he considered ultra-nationalism to be the main cause for this development, or in other words the intolerant and absolute quest for world domination of the European powers.22 That was a shared belief in many European circles, but the development in Germany was especially unique, as the option for the new State to delegate parts of its sovereignty to a supranational entity was made explicit by its founders. This was clearly expressed in article 24 of the constitution of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany and at that time it was unprecedented in European constitutional history.23 To the Federation was given the fundamental and integral authority to transfer sovereign rights to international institutions and to do so by ordinary legislation. In doing so, possible doubts about the constitutionality of even radical developments in that direction were prevented.24 Europe had to face the consequences of its own mistakes and excesses. At the same time as Europe lost power, the world was now dominated by two contrasting superpowers. In this confrontation were represented two opposing world views, one based on western democracy, the other one on communism. Adenauer aimed at bringing together under the western leadership the European States that were not yet ruled by communist regimes.25 Adenauer understood before others that the world as it was at the end of the conflict had changed dramatically, as he adopted a position that was ahead of his time and that was still difficult to be found in large portions of the German middle-class.26
Adenauer’s policies on the subject of German reunification need to be seen from the perspective of Europe being involved in an essential anti-Soviet role. Reunification was an issue that could not be isolated from the wider dynamics of world politics, in which Germany had become mainly a passive actor, and it could only be achieved once the causes of the tensions between East and West would cease to exist. And that was not to happen in the foreseeable future. The only realistic way to achieve reunification would be for western Germany to become economically and politically strong within a closely integrated western Europe.27 Faced with the strengthening of the FRG, its ever closer integration with the West and its imminent rearmament, the Russians orchestrated between 1950 and 1954 a series of initiatives at international level and through the German Democratic Republic with the goal of a united but neutral Germany. In March 1952 Stalin proposed a plan in two Notes for an independent Germany and free elections to be held with the supervision of the four great powers. Under the plan Germany would not be allowed to make alliances against former enemies but it would not be burdened with demands for reparations, denazification and for the socialisation of the economy. It would also be allowed to have its own armed forces for defensive purposes only.28 According to many, including Schumacher, Kaiser (who had become Federal Minister of All-German Affairs) and part of the press, Adenauer should have had a more positive attitude toward Stalin’s initiative, and believed that it was a missed opportunity.29 The debate is still open today if those initiatives were indeed sincere and would have contributed to establishing a neutral independent Germany or if they were just attempts to slow down the western integration and undermine Adenauer’s government.30 Adenauer believed that it was necessary to insist on the project of a common European defence bound to the Western alliance, rather than invest on a high-risk policy that could see a neutral Germany become a vacuum in central Europe that instead of encouraging reconciliation would instead be a source of tensions. With its demographic, economic and military potential, it would always be a target of interest for the Soviet Union, and it would not be able to resist Soviet influence on its own, especially as a neutral Germany would see American and British forces leaving the European continent. Moreover, in a neutral Germany it would be easier for the strong French and Italian communist parties to support the underground activity of the German communists.31 To be neutral would only be a preliminary phase before Germany became a Soviet State, which was the real objective of Soviet Russia. Another reason for Adenauer to reject the plan was that he feared that the winning powers could find an agreement that was detrimental for the future of Germany.32 His main goal was to achieve a degree of integration with the democratic West for the largest possible portion of German territory to a point of no return.33 In the aftermath of the war and under the leadership of De Gaulle, Adenauer worried about a reconciliation between France and Russia. During the Kennedy presidency he was afraid that a nuclear agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union could have negative consequences for German interests. His efforts for a united Europe were intended to reinforce solidarity among western powers and to make such an agreement impossible to attain.34
1. D.G. Williamson, Germany from Defeat to Partition 1945-1963 (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2014), 8. See also Giuseppe Mammarella, La Germania da Adenauer a oggi (Roma/Bari: Laterza, 1979), 34.
2. Donatella Viti, “L'integrazione europea e la Francia”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 371.
3. Viti, “Integrazione europea e Francia”, 373.
4. “Address given by Winston Churchill (Zurich, 19 September 1946)”, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), University of Luxembourg, last modified 6 May 2014, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/address_given_by_winston_churchill_zurich_19_september_1946-en-7dc5a4cc-4453-4c2a-b130-b534b7d76ebd.html.
5. Viti, “Integrazione europea e Francia”, 371.
6. Viti, “Integrazione europea e Francia”, 376.
7. Sergio Chillé, “Gli Stati Uniti e l'integrazione europea, 1946-1957”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 475.
8. “Statute of the Council of Europe”, Council of Europe, Conventions, accessed 22 October 2020, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680935bd0.
9. “The establishment of Western European Union (WEU)”, Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE), University of Luxembourg, last modified 7 July 2016, https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/the_establishment_of_western_european_union_weu-en-93ad0d9e-61f3-47eb-b895-e28e4c135751.html.
10. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band 2, Die Ära Adenauer, Gründerjahre der Republik 1949-1957 (Stuttgart/Wiesbaden: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt/F.A. Brockhaus Verlag, 1981), 475.
11. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 22-23. Mammarella, Germania da Adenauer a oggi, 47.
12. Oberbürgermeister of Düsseldorf, 1946; CDU Prime Minister of North Rhineland-Westphalia, 1947-55; President of the Bundesrat, 1949-53. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 154.
13. Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, 29-30.
14. Schwarz, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik, 34.
15. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 130-131.
16. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 29.
17. “Die Geschichte des Auswärtigen Amts”, Auswärtiges Amt, Internetredaktion, last modified 6 August 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aamt/geschichte-des-auswaertigen-amts.
18. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 39.
19. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 56.
20. Herbert Müller-Roschach, Die deutsche Europapolitik 1949-1977. Eine politische Chronik (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1980), 13.
21. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 39.
22. Winfried Baumgart, “La politica europeistica di Adenauer 1945-1963”, in Konrad Adenauer e Alcide De Gasperi: due esperienze di rifondazione della democrazia, ed. Umberto Corsini and Konrad Repgen, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984), 364.
23. Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 388.
24. Raffaele D’Agata, “L’integrazione europea e la Germania”, in Storia dell'integrazione europea vol. I, ed. Romain H. Rainero (Roma: Marzorati, 1997), 570.
25. Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 365.
26. D'Agata, “Integrazione europea e Germania”, 575.
27. Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 369-370.
28. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 43.
29. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 134.
30. In favour of the missed opportunity see Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1994). For a more sceptical take see Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 369-371.
31. The government submitted a petition to the Federal Constitutional Court requesting a ban on the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) on 23 November 1951. With the verdict on 17 August 1956 the Federal Constitutional Court ordered the party to be dissolved and banned. For the verdict see “BVerfG, Urteil vom 17.08.1956 - 1 BvB 2/51”, openJur e.V., accessed 9 November 2020, https://openjur.de/u/335396.html.
32. Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 374-375.
33. Williamson, From defeat to partition, 139-140.
34. Baumgart, “Politica europeistica di Adenauer”, 375.